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The fate of British finance following the Brexit referendum revolves around the "resilience or relocation" debate: will the City of London continue to thrive as the world's leading financial centre or will the bulk of its activity move to rival hubs after departure from EU trading arrangements? Despite extensive commentary, there remains no systematic analysis of this question since the Leave vote. This paper addresses that lacuna by evaluating the empirical evidence concerning jobs, investments, and share of key trading markets (between June 2016 and May 2020). Contrary to widely held expectations, the evidence suggests that the City has been remarkably resilient. Brexit has had no significant impact on jobs and London has consolidated its position as the chief location for financial FDI, FinTech funding, and attracting new firms. Most unexpectedly, the City has increased its dominance in major infrastructure markets such as (euro-denominated) clearing, derivatives, and foreign exchange – although it has lost out in the handling of European repurchase agreements. Based upon this evidence, the paper argues that the UK's negotiating position is stronger than typically recognised, and outlines the competitive ramifications for both the UK and EU financial sector.

This article argues for the utility in conceiving of two distinctive approaches to the structural power of finance—New Structural Power (NSP) and Traditional Structural Power (TSP). While both are crucial to political economy scholarship, this article highlights the intellectual trade-off that is inherent to the adoption of one perspective over the other, and it stresses the explanatory advantages of the TSP perspective specifically. First, it shows how the TSP framework can facilitate an understanding of when policymaker ideas do and do not matter in the exercise of structural power, retaining the concept of "automaticity" in structural power operations. Second, it demonstrates how each framework is custom-built to explain substantively different aspects of the policy process, with TSP research aimed at system-oriented limitation mechanisms and NSP research aimed at agent-oriented selection mechanisms. Third, it contends that TSP formulations must be embedded within a model of (contradictory) functional explanation, which is the best way to gain empirical traction on the most important macrostructural developments in contemporary finance-led capitalism. Methodologically, this implies an agenda of "explanation through commonalities" rather than the NSP-favored "explanation through variation."

The fate of British finance following the Brexit referendum revolves around the "resilience or relocation" debate: will the City of London continue to thrive as the world's leading financial centre or will the bulk of its activity move to rival hubs after departure from EU trading arrangements? Despite extensive commentary, there remains no systematic analysis of this question since the Leave vote. This paper addresses that lacuna by evaluating the empirical evidence concerning jobs, investments, and share of key trading markets (between June 2016 and May 2020). Contrary to widely held expectations, the evidence suggests that the City has been remarkably resilient. Brexit has had no significant impact on jobs and London has consolidated its position as the chief location for financial FDI, FinTech funding, and attracting new firms. Most unexpectedly, the City has increased its dominance in major infrastructure markets such as (euro-denominated) clearing, derivatives, and foreign exchange - although it has lost out in the handling of European repurchase agreements. Based upon this evidence, the paper argues that the UK's negotiating position is stronger than typically recognised, and outlines the competitive ramifications for both the UK and EU financial sector. ; "Resilience" oder "Relocation"? Das Schicksal des britischen Finanzsektors nach dem Brexit-Referendum ist Gegenstand lebhafter Debatten: Wird die City of London ihre Bedeutung als einer der weltweit führenden Finanzplätze wahren oder wird ein Großteil ihrer Tätigkeiten nach dem Austritt aus den EU-Handelsverträgen an konkurrierende Standorte verlagert? Trotz zahlreicher Meinungsäußerungen liegt seit der Ausstiegsentscheidung Großbritanniens keine systematische Analyse dieser Frage vor. Um diese Lücke zu füllen, wertet das vorliegende Papier die empirische Evidenz in Bezug auf Arbeitsplätze, Investitionen und Anteile an den wichtigsten Handelsmärkten (zwischen Juni 2016 und Mai 2020) aus. Entgegen weitläufigen Annahmen deuten die Auswertungsergebnisse darauf hin, dass sich die City als bemerkenswert resilient erweist. Der Brexit hatte bis heute keine signifikanten Auswirkungen auf den Arbeitsmarkt, London konnte weiterhin neue Unternehmen anwerben und seine Position als wichtigster Standort für ausländische Direktinvestitionen und die Finanzierung von FinTech festigen. Am meisten jedoch dürfte überraschen, dass die City ihre Dominanz auf wichtigen Infrastrukturmärkten, wie denen für das (Euro-)Clearing, für Derivate und Devisen, ausbauen konnte - wenngleich sie bei der Abwicklung europäischer Rückkaufvereinbarungen Einbußen zu verzeichnen hat. Auf Basis dieser Erkenntnisse argumentiert das Papier, dass die britische Verhandlungsposition stärker ist als gemeinhin angenommen, und umreißt die Folgen dieses Umstands für die Durchsetzungschancen sowohl des britischen als auch des EU-Finanzsektors.

AbstractThis paper argues that the Big Four accountancy firms—PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG—operate as key political allies of the financial sector within financial regulatory battles. Leveraging the theoretical notion of "actor plurality" within the policymaking process, I demonstrate how, in the case of the European Union Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) initiative, accountancy professionals offered crucial support for the financial sector. They did so by disseminating key oppositional claims against the FTT proposal, developing tax mitigation and relocation strategies, preparing negative impact assessments, and advising on lobbying tactics. This allied stance of the Big Four is primarily a consequence of the ways in which their commercial priorities have been fundamentally transformed by the provision of consultancy services within the modern global economy. Moreover, the paper shows how accountancy experts are deeply embedded within a network of professional relationships that fosters substantive policy alignment between the Big Four and prominent financial lobbying groups. By highlighting the overlooked role of the major accountancy firms within post crisis regulatory reform, the study illuminates the unequal power relations that permeate financialized societies and contributes to a deeper understanding of how financial preferences continue to prevail within the policymaking process.

Through empirical investigation of the Eurozone and Greek debt crisis 2010–12, this article demonstrates how a peak organization of financial firms—the Institute of International Finance (IIF)—was able to mobilize its members transnationally to secure several key political and economic objectives. At the height of the crisis, large European banking firms were threatened by the prospect of a disorderly Greek default, coercive intervention by governments, and, potentially, a regional banking collapse. In this context, representatives from the IIF entered the policymaking process to facilitate concerted private sector action, assisting EU officials with the negotiation of a substantial and orderly creditor writedown, and cooperating with legal action by the Greek government to sideline a minority of financial firms hostile to the deal. The article shows that the IIF's disproportionate influence over policymaking was a result of their technical expertise, their ability to recruit individuals with long-standing experience of sovereign debt restructuring from the public and private sector, and the operation of elite revolving-door processes. In contrast to recent studies showing that financial actors are able to exercise more power at the national level by remaining collectively inactive, these findings suggest that, at the transnational level, financial actors can be most effective at securing their preferences when they are well organized and when they coordinate politically on the basis of collective interests.

This article examines the ways in which the self-responsibilized individualism underpinning contemporary concepts of the ideal European citizen, on the one hand (Frericks, 2014), and the inequalities and anti-democratic politics that characterize contemporary neoliberal capitalism, on the other, are co-constituent elements in creating an antipathy to forms of solidarity that are affective as opposed to calculative. The active citizenship framework lacks a full appreciation of the interdependency of the human condition and is antithetical to universalistic, affectively-led forms of solidarity. The deep relationality that is endemic to both social production and reproduction, and that impels an affective, morally-led form of solidarity needs to be recognized academically and intellectually, and politically sustained, if we are to move beyond a narrow, calculative, self-interested vision of solidarity in Europe.

This paper contributes to Comparative Political Economy (CPE), developing an analytical concept of corporate welfare. Corporate welfare - the transfer of public funds and benefits to corporate actors with weak or no conditionality - is a prominent form of state-business relations that CPE scholarship regularly overlooks and misinterprets. Such transfers should be understood as a structural privilege of business in a globalized post-Fordist capitalism, and an increasingly common strategy through which states attempt to steward national economic dynamism within a highly constrained range of policy options. However, without a well-developed concept of corporate welfare - premised upon the key criterion of conditionality - studies that identify a 'return' of the state in industrial planning misrepresent these transfers to business as a reassertion of state influence and control, rather than a reflection of state weakness and subordination. The paper provides the analytical building blocks to properly conceptualize transfers to business, works out the core challenges for empirical research, and provides empirical illustrations of this burgeoning phenomenon from the fields of unconventional monetary policy, privatization, and urban political economy. ; Der Aufsatz entwickelt ein analytisches Konzept der corporate welfare für die Vergleichende Politische Ökonomie. Corporate welfare - der Transfer öffentlicher Mittel an Unternehmen mit schwachen oder gar keinen Konditionalitäten - ist weitverbreitet und wird regelmäßig übersehen oder falsch eingeordnet. Solche Transfers sollten als strukturelles Privileg von Wirtschaftsunternehmen im postfordistischen Kapitalismus verstanden werden und als eine zunehmend verbreitete Strategie, mit der Staaten versuchen, wirtschaftliche Dynamik innerhalb eines stark eingeschränkten Spektrums politischer Optionen zu erzeugen. Ohne ein entwickeltes Konzept der corporate welfare - das auf dem Schlüsselkriterium der Konditionalität basiert - stellen Studien, die eine Rückkehr der Industriepolitik diagnostizieren, Transfers an Unternehmen fälschlicherweise als Wiederbelebung staatlichen Einflusses dar. Der Aufsatz liefert die analytischen Bausteine für eine angemessene Konzeptualisierung von Transfers an Unternehmen, arbeitet die zentralen Herausforderungen für die empirische Forschung heraus und liefert empirische Illustrationen des Problems aus den Bereichen unkonventionelle Geldpolitik, Privatisierungen und regionale Wirtschaftsförderung.